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III.—THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY IN
ITALIAN SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY.1
BY ANGELO CBESPI.
THE following considerations have been suggested by several
assertions we have seen concerning Herbert Spencer's place
in the history of the genesis of a scientific interpretation of
the world. Thoroughly conscious that the importance for
that interpretation of the English psychology of the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries cannot be exaggerated, we
endeavour to show that Spencer's solution of the problem
of causality and of the uniformity of natural laws not only
does not bear the weight of a severe criticism, but represents
a step backwards in regard to the method followed by the
traditional tendency which had its chief interpreters in
David Hume and John Stuart Mill. Moreover, we think
that those authors failed to reach the true solution, not
because of any insufficiency inherent in their rigidly experi-
mental method excluding every apriorism, but solely because
of insufficient application of the method itself, and of an
insufficiently deep analysis; so that, implicitly, we assume
that the objective value of the principle of causality can be
shown by experience to be inherent in the real in itself, and
not to be the mere result of rational deductions or of in-
ductive reasonings. This assertion indeed constitutes one
of the most peculiar marks of the present Italian scientific
philosophy, the most authoritative apostle of which, Eobert
Ardigo, Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Royal
University of Padua, really deserves, according to many
whose opinion is of weight, to be considered as a powerful
and respectable competitor to Herbert Spencer. And this
1
 Since this article was written, a long time ago, some alterations hap-
pened in the writer's degree of adhesion to the chief points of Prof.
Ardig&'s philosophy; but the article has been left untouched because,
after all, the historical significance of the theory of causality developed
through it remains, and though in need of further developments and of
some substantial change, its fruit-bearing character remains as well. —THE
AUTHOR.
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not only because of his wide systematic views concerning
•every class of phenomena, but especially because of the deep
originality of his principles; so that Ardigo appears at the
same time as the only thinker wholly true to the empiric
method who, notwithstanding, has a rational cosmology,
and as the only thinker who has the clear idea of the natural-
ness of every bond between phenomena.
Eveiy cosmological conception is invariably conditioned
by the conception a thinker has about the value of human
understanding. That is one of the clearest lessons from the
history of philosophy.
Therefore, let us shortly recall the terms of the question
and those of his solution.
It is well known that, according to David Hume's theory,
from which that of John Stuart Mill does not substantially
•differ, our knowledge is essentially nothing else than a clas-
sification of sensitive perceptions according to their relations
of likeness and unlikeness, of co-existence and succession.
The processus of this classification is that of Association.
Our knowledge, in consequence, being only a co-ordination
of subjective perceptions, we are not warranted in dogmatis-
ing about objective existence, and every " necessary " belief
is based only upon custom. The mind fails to detect any
nexus whatever between phenomena. Starting with this
conception of our knowledge, the only possible view of the
world consistent with it, was that of an aggregate of facts exist-
ing by no inherent necessity and resting upon the arbitrary.
Spencer's position is less far from this point of view than
might at first be supposed.
Indeed in the First Principles, as well as in the Principles
of Psychology, or in the 660th section of the Principles of Sociology,
he expresses the quite clear conviction that the nexus between
the different phenomena, however certain, belongs to the
sphere of the Unknowable. So that in the last analysis we
remain with a sceptical conclusion. It is true that, follow-
ing Hamilton, he tried to show the uniformity of nature and
the law of causation to be a mental necessity, an aspect of
the persistence of force, that is to say, a corollary of our
being unable to conceive a fact as issuing from or as passing
into nothingness. But it seems to us that this solution is
not tenable. .Historically, the asserted " inability to conceive"
is in contradiction with many beliefs in which a total or a
partial misknowledge of causality was implicit; and in any
case, this principle is only a final conclusion, never a starting-
point ; it may express the supreme generalisation of science,
not in the least its support and foundation. This point of
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view leaves quite unanswered the chief problem: What is
the objective range of the idea of cause? What is the
ultimate reason of our belief in the principle of causality?
It appears clearly at first that if we never detect any nexus
between facts, no succession of facts, however often repeated
through millions of animal and human generations, could
in the least suggest the idea of such a nexus. Why do we
project our volitional experience as causative beings in certain
cases and not in others, or, to speak more exactly, why in
many cases do we not desist from projecting this experience
into external changes and in many others cease doing
so ? It seems to us that only Ardigo's epistemology answers
quite satisfactorily all these problems, or, at least, contains
the secret of the answer, and only upon his answer to these
points can a rational cosmology be legitimately built. We
shall shortly summarise his guiding gnoseological ideas,
chiefly contained in Empirismo e Scienza, in II Vero, in La
formazione naturale nel fatto del Sistema Solare, and in two
works concerning the Unknowable of Herbert Spencer and the
Nownenon of Kant.
II.
Just as the observation of the fact of light is sufficient to
authorise us to affirm as absolutely real the existence of light,
so the observation of any psychical fact is sufficient for the
affirmation of such a fact as absolutely real; that is to say,
as a datum not at all relative to any other reality, and hot in
the least suggesting the thought of any reality beyond that
which constitutes its own being, not even that of the Self
or of the Not-Self. So that, quite rightly, Condillac asserted
that, on the hypothesis that a marble statue could suddenly
become conscious of the perfume of a rose, the consciousness
of that statue would only be constituted by the sensation of
that perfume, not in the least referred to any subject or ob-
ject. Prof. Ardlgd expresses this by saying that every element
of our experience and our experience itself as a whole, is not
in the least relative, but, on the contrary, is absolutely true,
and that the relativity only concerns the further differentiated
parts of our experience, just as, e.g., a circumference is in
itself an absolutely real entity, and relativity can be found
only between its geometrical element!. Therefore the law
of association has, in the Italian philosopher's conception, a
quite different reach from that given to it in the traditional
English psychology; for such a law is not asked to give
us more than it may find in the content of the data and in
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the relations between these data, on which it is working, and,
in consequence, not even the causative nexus, if this is not
given as a datum of experience. If we are well convinced
that every sensation possesses in itself an absolute truth, that
truth, because of which it is that especial fact and not
another, or the image of any other; that is to say, if we are
well convinced that every sensation in itself is a bit of ab-
solute reality, having a value, because of this very fact of its
existence, quite preceding and superior to any other value,
which it will get afterwards, as entering into relations with
other data or groups of data, we shall very easily understand
that through the different ways of association we do not
create any truth or constitutive principle of our understand-
ing, but only discover those truths and those laws of the
reality which are given in the elementary data or in those
groups of these data which are, as such, given by immediate
experience. Before approaching more intimately our especial
question, it will be well to elucidate this point. Just as the
anvil and the hammer are made of the same matter and only
differ because of their mutual relations, so the Self and the
Not-Self differ only because of the new mutual relations be-
tween the same elements of which both are constituted.
The same perception, indeed, according to the different cases,
may appear as belonging to the subject or to the object.
But, just because every elementary datum is a real in itself
not yet classified as belonging to any subjective or objective
world, and as this reality is presupposed in every further classi-
fication according to Prof. Ardigo's views, we are not at all
authorised in saying, as subjective idealism does, that sub-
jective reality, the psychological world, has in itself a more
immediate and deeper reality than the objective world, which
has only a derived and symbolical value.
Indeed, this assertion forgets that the classification of a
perception or of any representation, as a part of the psycho-
logical world, is only possible after the differentiation of ex-
perience in the two aspects of the Self and of the Not-Self, that
is to say, that that perception is not in itself a psychical or
physical phenomenon, but comes to belong to one of these
classes only through its being distinguished by us as such,
after that differentiation. Therefore the reality of the sub-
jective and objective world is exactly of the same degree;
both are two branches from the same stem, two sides of the
same processus of polarisation of the experience as a whole.
The real is not conceived through the subject, but it is given
in the subject as well as in the object, or, more exactly, being
given in itself, it gives its own reality to make the second-
24
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hand reality of the Self and of the Not-Self through a correla-
tive processus of differentiation.
So that the reason of the affirmation of the reality of the
subjective and of the objective world, is nothing else but the
reality of their elements, their existence as a last datura of
experience, imposing itself quite independently of every
other reality with which, only afterwards, relations may
arise. The new derived realities are only a continuation of
the formerly given reality of the pure undifferentiated experi-
ence, which, in being differentiated did not in the least degree
imply disruption. The fact itself of the correlation between
the subjective and the objective world means that both are
radically joined by the identical nature of their unities.
If we have fully grasped this fact that the differentiation of
the experience, which is the development of the real, does not
split and destroy the primordial unity of the real itself, which,
still is underlying both Self and Not-Self as their constitutive
elements, just as the differentiation of the primordial nebula
in the several elements of the actual solar system did not
break and suppress their fundamental unity which still re-
mains, we shall be enabled to discern the absurdity of the
problem of casuality in its traditional form. The absurdity
lies in the proposal to discover what value the merely sub-
jective principle of casuality may have for the interpretation
of an external world supposed to be quite inaccessible to us
in the unity of its being. And at the same time we shall be
warranted in attributing to it an absolute value, whether in
the subjective or in the objective sphere, if we shall find the
causative nexus in those data of experience, which constitute
the common root of both subject and object.
III.
Why does every ordinary man believe that the elevation
of the eyelids is the cause of the visual sensation ? Only be-
cause of this: that the experience gives to him both as one
fact, the unity of which as a whole is to him empirically
certain. This becomes plain when we consider that another
man, e.g., a physiologist, detects several moments in the
same fact of vision, wherein the ignorant discern only two
moments, and what is the progress of science but a continu-
ous discovery of many facts where formerly only one was
perceived ? These remarks lead us to acknowledge another
deficiency of English doctrines of causality. They apply as-
sociation to explain the belief in necessary causative nexus,
but they consider the fact-cause and the fact-effect as being
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connected through association, though in themselves they
are without discernible connexion. The truth is just the
contrary. It is not through association that they are con-
nected ; they are given us already connected in observation.
The point missed by the English psychologists was just this,
that, although through abstraction we can separate the
several moments of a causal process, yet it is only when
they appear as moments of one fact, like points of one con-
tinuous line, that we are compelled to believe in the exist-
ence of a causal nexus. Many examples may be adduced to
explain and justify our assertion of continuity between the
several moments of one fact. When any one is making micro-
scopical researches, he begins by examining his object under
a low magnifying power. In this way he gets the know-
ledge or the representation of that object as a whole.
When afterwards he looks at the same object under a
greater magnifying power, he discovers several details; but
his understanding of these details is only possible through
the prior representation of the object as a whole. This
representation plays, so to say, the rdle of a background in
a painting, and makes visible the unity of apperception,
whereby every detail is apprehended as connected with the
others and as a constitutive element of the one object. The
same happens in the progressive knowledge of a mountain.
Ignorant and learned men begin by having the indefinite re-
presentation of an immense mass of stones. But little by
little one discovers several aspects ignored by the others,
one sees distinctly where others still see indistinctly; but
for him also the new discernments have a meaning only
through the place they take as referred to the previous in-
distinct representation of the mountain as a whole, which is
the reason of our persistent belief in the connexion of the
discovered details. They are still thought as belonging to
that mountain, and in certain mutual relations, because we
discerned them within the whole of that mountain and sub-
ject to those relations. Knowledge is always passing from
the indistinct to the distinct, the connexions of the distinct
parts being explained by the persistent unity of the under-
lying indistinct. It is the same with regard to the causal
nexus. No fact or thing is so simple that it cannot be con-
ceived or shown to be the result of smaller elements, and no
fact or thing is so constituted that it cannot be conceived or
shown to be part of an including system. Therefore if one
fact is carefully studied and several moments are distinctly
perceived in its development, the connexion between these
several moments will be given by the representation of the
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fact as a whole, within which they have been apperceived ;
and, again and for ever, as every one of these moments can
be found to be the succession of several smaller fractions
of time, so the representation of each moment as a whole
will again be cause of the affirmed existing connexion be-
tween the several smaller phases of its becoming. And the
opposite process also takes place. Several facts hitherto
quite disconnected cannot but be thought as in necessary
causal connexion, when given by experience as moments of
an unexpected continuous line. The mistake of the English
psychologists in their theory of causality has been that of
considering only the distinct points of the lines and of
neglecting the continuity between them, continuity which is
not less real because of its being indistinct. They acted like a
hypothetical geologist who should regard each of the several
beds he discovered in a sedimentary deposit in complete
isolation from the rest. The representation of the deposit as
a real whole is just the reason because of which every geolo-
gist, although continually distinguishing new moments in its
history, considers the successive layers as constitutive parts
of it. And why ? Only because their subordinate reality is
by experience given him together with a greater and includ-
ing reality. The latter is not less real than the former, and,
again, between one stratum and another and within each
one, there are many quite ignored phases; but they are in-
cluded in the whole; its indistinct reality fills the emptiness
of the distinct knowledge. Far from seeing every thing or
fact as always disconnected, we always see everything as a
part of something else and including something else.
IV.
Therefore causation is inherent in experience to the real
in itself, independently of its further differentiation in Self
and in Not-Self. What wonder that causal relations may
be found in these two derived sides of the same real and
between them also! Indeed the differentiation left quite un-
touched the absolute reality of their elements. So to say
through that differentiation, the causality itself appeared
here as subjective and there as objective; but in both the rea-
sons of its being affirmed were the same. So long as we fail
to see that the Self and the Not-Self, the internal and the
external world are nothing else than differentiations of the
same real, the problem of their mutual relations is bound to
appear as for ever insoluble. But for those who succeed in
seeing that both are included in an absolutely given and
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indifferentiated psycho-physical reality, the continuity of
which is still underlying them, the problem of their causation
is quite like any other: not harder, not easier. Just as the
representation of the fact of sight, as a whole, gives the
connexion between the several causative moments succes-
sively discovered within it by science, in the same way the
representation of the real in itself, independently of every
further elaborated differentiation, gives us, in its unity and
sameness, the connexion of the two derived worlds of the
subject and of the object. To explain is nothing but to
find and recognise the indistinct unity of which the fact
to be explained is an element. Experience gives the real
in its unity; analysis distinguishes and distinctly catches
the several sides of the real; the task of philosophy is the
same task of understanding, that is to say, the reconstitution
of the total representation of the real as one whole through
a process of recognition of every distinct as a part of an
including indistinct, up to that indistinct which, in every
stage of the knowledge, is such because in that stage it
could not be further distinguished, and which is the supreme
general scheme justifying the affirmed unity of all the
subordinate distincts. Just as every further distinction of
points in a continuous line never suppresses the continuity
of the line between the several points and the possibility
of further distinctions, so that the continuity of the line
gives the explanation of the relation between those points,
so every further distinction in the knowledge of every phe-
nomenon or of the universe as a whole, will never suppress
the continuity of the indistinct part between phenomena,
which is the reason of their unity, whether the reference
be to the infinitely great or to the infinitely small. In this
way the world is no more, as in Hume, John Stuart Mill
and, implicitly, in Spencer's doctrines, a mere collection of
fact, only joined by the mental process of association, but
appears as one fact, nay, as the only real fact, of which we
distinctly catch only several moments following each other
in that general form of sequence we recognise as causality.
In this way once more epistemology is shown to be in in-
timate connexion with cosmology ; no induction from millions
and millions of experiences of human and animal generations,
no deduction from any so-called ultimate postulate of thought,
is wanted in such a cosmology as a condition of its possibility;
the fact is sufficient. For a cosmology reaching the point
of its ideal perfection, the only possible task would be that
of giving a representation of the real in which the greatest
variety of the world considered from a dynamic point of
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view would look identical with its deepest sameness, frorn
a static one ; viz., its task would be that of representing the
unity of Being. The uniformity of natural laws, instead of
being a mysterious instinct or a deductive corollary, would
only be the expression of the unfailing and everlasting
identity of the real with itself, of the real, which cannot be
unreal. This, shortly, is the philosophy of causality in Prof.
Ardigo's epistemological and cosmological conception, and
it seems to us to be a great step towards the traditional aim
of English experimental philosophy, the exclusion of the
apriori from the science of human knowledge. As we said
in the first paragraph of this essay, it may be clearly seen
that, while one spirit and one method, although applied with
different degrees of exactness and depth, inspires the doctrines
of David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Eobert Ardigd, that
is to say, the rigid aposteriorism, there is on the contrary a>
profound difference betv/een the Italian thinker and Herbert
Spencer, with regard to method as well as with regard
to results, which in the latter are undoubtedly sceptical,
if we consider his own last views concerning the value of
his doctrine of the Unknowable. If we consider that Prof.
Ardigd is the only Italian thinker who now has a real system-
atic body of doctrines and that his theory of Natural Forma-
tion is the only work which aims at the same goal as the
First Principles of Spencer, though with deeper penetration,
the hope that his philosophy may become the object of some
consideration in England will not be judged as a temerarious
one, especially if we shall add that he is at the same time
the most authoritative interpreter of that innate tendency
of the Latin spirit, which gave to the world the genial
naturalistic intuitions of Giordano Bruno and the experi-
mentalism of Galileo.
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